From working with customers we commonly get questions about exclusions for ASR and the impact of the exclusions or when it will work or not.
Indicators in MDE does work for ASR, but not all Indicator types. Defender Antimalware exclusions does work for ASR, but not all rules honor the exclusions. Here are a few tables from learn which can help you with this:
Rules which does not honor Defender Antivirus exclusions
Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes
Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)
Block Office applications from creating executable content
Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes
Block Office communication application from creating child processes
Rules which does not honor Defender for Endpoint (MDE) Indicators of type Certificate
Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)
Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes
There 2 new ASR (Attack Surface Reduction Rules) available.
Attack Surface Reduction Rules is a Defender feature which, as it sounds, reduces attack surface on endpoints. This is done by blocking certain attack surfaces like “Block all Office applications from creating child processes”, “Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB” and more, there are 19 rules available today. Two of which are in preview.
The great thing about ASR is that it closes some attack paths, instead of relying on Antivirus or EDR to detect on the malicious code or behavior since these changes all the time.
The new rules:
Block rebooting machine in Safe Mode (preview)
GUID: 33ddedf1-c6e0-47cb-833e-de6133960387
This rule prevents the execution of commands to restart machines in Safe Mode.
Safe Mode is a diagnostic mode that only loads the essential files and drivers needed for Windows to run. However, in Safe Mode, many security products are either disabled or operate in a limited capacity, which allows attackers to further launch tampering commands, or simply execute and encrypt all files on the machine. This rule blocks such attacks by preventing processes from restarting machines in Safe Mode.
Block use of copied or impersonated system tools (preview)
GUID: c0033c00-d16d-4114-a5a0-dc9b3a7d2ceb
his rule blocks the use of executable files that are identified as copies of Windows system tools. These files are either duplicates or impostors of the original system tools.
Some malicious programs may try to copy or impersonate Windows system tools to avoid detection or gain privileges. Allowing such executable files can lead to potential attacks. This rule prevents propagation and execution of such duplicates and imposters of the system tools on Windows machines.
Please note that since these 2 new rules are in preview, additional upgrades to improve efficacy are under development
Alright, since I happen to be in a blog mode I keep the posts coming.
This post continue to explore the hunting capatibilities in Defender ATP by query for Exploit Guard detections.
So what’s this Exploit Guard?
Windows Defender Exploit Guard is a new set of intrusion prevention capabilities which are built-in with Windows 10, 1709 and newer versions.
Exploit Guard consists of 4 components which are designed to lock down the device against a wide variety of attack vectors and block behaviors commonly used in malware attacks, while enabling enterprises to balance their security risk and productivity requirements
Component
Details
Attack Surface Reduction (ASR)
A set of controls that enterprises can enable to prevent malware from getting on the machine by blocking Office-, script-, and email-based threats
Network Protection
Protects the endpoint against web-based threats by blocking any outbound process on the device to untrusted hosts/IP through Windows Defender SmartScreen
Controlled Folder Access
Protects sensitive data from ransomware by blocking untrusted processes from accessing your protected folders
Exploit Protection
A set of exploit mitigations (replacing EMET) that can be easily configured to protect your system and applications
Example of ASR rules
• Block Office apps from creating executable content • Block Office apps from launching child process • Block Office apps from injecting into process • Block Win32 imports from macro code in Office • Block obfuscated macro code
Exploit Guard is configured through MDM (Intune) or SCCM or GPO’s or PowerShell.
If you have Microsoft 365 E5 license or Threat Protection license package, you don’t have to use Windows Event Forward to get the events in a central log solution. They will automatically be forwarded to your Microsoft 365 security portal https://security.microsoft.com where you have a nice looking dashboard where you can see alerts and configurations of ASR and other things.
This following dashboard is a part from the Monitor and Report section in the portal
Back to Defender ATP and the hunting which this post was supposed to be all about.
We have published some posts now about hunting custom alerts.
In the query console in Defender ATP we started to go backwards to find the ASR events. It’s simple. configure your client, run a few attacks which will trigger the alerts.
We looked in the MiscEvents for all events (filtered on computername and time). Which gaves us ideas of ActionTypes to use in the query.
Examples from the output:
AsrOfficeMacroWin32ApiCallsAudited
AsrPsexecWmiChildProcessBlocked
ControlledFolderAccessViolationBlocked
ExploitGuardAcgAudited
ExploitGuardChildProcessAudited
ExploitGuardNetworkProtectionBlocked
ExploitGuardNonMicrosoftSignedAudited
ExploitGuardWin32SystemCallBlocked
SmartScreenAppWarning
SmartScreenUrlWarning
SmartScreenUserOverride
Interesting note “SmartScreenUserOverride” is a separate event which you can query
When we had the raw Actiontypes we created the query to cover as much as we could.
//Happy Hunting
MiscEvents
| where ActionType contains "asr" or
ActionType contains "Exploit" or
ActionType contains "SmartScreen" or
ActionType contains "ControlledFolderAccess"
| extend JsonOut = parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| sort by EventTime desc
| project EventTime, ComputerName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ActionType,
FileName, FolderPath, RemoteUrl, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
JsonOut.IsAudit,JsonOut.Uri,JsonOut.RuleId,JsonOut.ActivityId
We are also parsing AdditionalFields to be able to add extra value to events which contained such data.
From this point we can do additional filters. For example, if you want to enable ASR enterprise wide, set them in auditmode and report on the alerts without affect user productivity, remediate and the do a enterprise wide block enrollment
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