A while ago Microsoft released the Threat Hunting capatibilities in WD ATP.
This is a great feature since you’re able to query a lot of things across your devices.
Example scenario:
Let’s say you receive IoC’s for an ongoing attack or investigate threat actors with known files or IP’s you can Query these IoC’s on both on-prem devices and devices which only exists on the internet and never in the office.
That’s one of the benefits of using cloud security services.
As we wrote in the last post it’s now possible to onboard older operating systems like Windows 7 and Windows 8.1. There is also possible to onboard Linux systems and Macs
Threat Hunting
The hunting capatibilities in WD ATP involves running queries and you’re able to query almost everything which can happen in the Operating System.
If you’re familiar with Sysinternals Sysmon your will recognize the a lot of the data which you can query.
AlertEvents
AlertId, EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, Severity, Category, Title, ActionType, FileName, SHA1, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, ReportId
MachineInfo
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ClientVersion, PublicIP, OSArchitecture, OSPlatform, OSBuild, IsAzureADJoined, LoggedOnUsers, MachineGroup, ReportId,
ProcessCreationEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, SHA256, MD5, ProcessId, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessIntegrityLevel, ProcessTokenElevation, ProcessCreationTime, AccountDomain, AccountName, AccountSid, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessSHA256, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, ReportId
NetworkCommunicationEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, LocalIP, LocalPort, LocalIPType, RemoteIPType, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, ReportId
FileCreationEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, SHA256, MD5, FileOriginUrl, FileOriginReferrerUrl, FileOriginIP, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, ReportId
RegistryEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, RegistryKey, RegistryValueType, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, PreviousRegistryValueName, PreviousRegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, ReportId
LogonEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, AccountDomain, AccountName, AccountSid, LogonType, ReportId
ImageLoadEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, MD5, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, ReportId
MiscEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, MD5, AccountDomain, AccountName, AccountSid, RemoteUrl, RemoteComputerName, ProcessCreationTime, ProcessTokenElevation, LogonId, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP, LocalPort, FileOriginUrl, FileOriginIP, AdditionalFields, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessSHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessLogonId, ReportId
The query language is very similar to Splunk and adoption to these queries should be straight forward
ProcessCreationEvents
| where EventTime > ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "Net.WebClient"
or ProcessCommandLine has "DownloadFile"
or ProcessCommandLine has "Invoke-WebRequest"
or ProcessCommandLine has "Invoke-Shellcode"
or ProcessCommandLine has "Invoke-Mimikatz"
or ProcessCommandLine has "http:"
| project EventTime, ComputerName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| top 100 by EventTime
Use “Project” to select which columns you want in the output and you can export the result to a spreadsheet.
In the above example we ran a query to find malicious powershell commands being executed.
You can also, for example, query all powershell executions from Office applications
ProcessCreationEvents
| where EventTime > ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "powershell"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpoint.exe")
You can also use the quick search to finns URL’s, File hashes, IPs
The output will show you hits in organization and prevalance world wide which will give you more indication of a threat.
When we search for a filehash we can also submit the file for deeper analysis.
Microsoft has a Github repositories to help you with example queries
https://github.com/Microsoft/WindowsDefenderATP-Hunting-Queries
Sharing Queries
When working in a team it’s a good idea to share your queries to let your colleagues to use your hunting queries.
The language reference is available here
https://docs.loganalytics.io/docs/Language-Reference/
Happy Hunting!
/Sec-Labs R&D
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