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Threat Hunting with Windows Defender ATP

A while ago Microsoft released the Threat Hunting capatibilities in WD ATP.

This is a great feature since you’re able to query a lot of things across your devices.

Example scenario:

Let’s say you receive IoC’s for an ongoing attack or investigate threat actors with known files or IP’s you can Query these IoC’s on both on-prem devices and devices which only exists on the internet and never in the office.

That’s one of the benefits of using cloud security services.

As we wrote in the last post it’s now possible to onboard older operating systems like Windows 7 and Windows 8.1. There is also possible to onboard Linux systems and Macs

linux_mac_atp

Threat Hunting

hunting_atp

The hunting capatibilities in WD ATP involves running queries and you’re able to query almost everything which can happen in the Operating System.

If you’re familiar with Sysinternals Sysmon your will recognize the a lot of the data which you can query.

 

AlertEvents
AlertId, EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, Severity, Category, Title, ActionType, FileName, SHA1, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, ReportId

MachineInfo
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ClientVersion, PublicIP, OSArchitecture, OSPlatform, OSBuild, IsAzureADJoined, LoggedOnUsers, MachineGroup, ReportId,

ProcessCreationEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, SHA256, MD5, ProcessId, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessIntegrityLevel, ProcessTokenElevation, ProcessCreationTime, AccountDomain, AccountName, AccountSid, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessSHA256, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, ReportId

NetworkCommunicationEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, LocalIP, LocalPort, LocalIPType, RemoteIPType, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, ReportId

FileCreationEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, SHA256, MD5, FileOriginUrl, FileOriginReferrerUrl, FileOriginIP, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, ReportId

RegistryEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, RegistryKey, RegistryValueType, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, PreviousRegistryValueName, PreviousRegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, ReportId

LogonEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, AccountDomain, AccountName, AccountSid, LogonType, ReportId

ImageLoadEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, MD5, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, ReportId

MiscEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, MD5, AccountDomain, AccountName, AccountSid, RemoteUrl, RemoteComputerName, ProcessCreationTime, ProcessTokenElevation, LogonId, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP, LocalPort, FileOriginUrl, FileOriginIP, AdditionalFields, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessSHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessLogonId, ReportId

The query language is very similar to Splunk and adoption to these queries should be straight forward

ProcessCreationEvents
| where EventTime > ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "Net.WebClient"
or ProcessCommandLine has "DownloadFile"
or ProcessCommandLine has "Invoke-WebRequest"
or ProcessCommandLine has "Invoke-Shellcode"
or ProcessCommandLine has "Invoke-Mimikatz"
or ProcessCommandLine has "http:"
| project EventTime, ComputerName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| top 100 by EventTime

Use “Project” to select which columns you want in the output and you can export the result to a spreadsheet.

output

In the above example we ran a query to find malicious powershell commands being executed.

You can also, for example, query all powershell executions from Office applications

ProcessCreationEvents
| where EventTime > ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "powershell"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpoint.exe")

You can also use the quick search to finns URL’s, File hashes, IPs

quick search

The output will show you hits in organization and prevalance world wide which will give you more indication of a threat.

When we search for a filehash we can also submit the file for deeper analysis.

Microsoft has a Github repositories to help you with example queries

https://github.com/Microsoft/WindowsDefenderATP-Hunting-Queries

Sharing Queries

When working in a team it’s a good idea to share your queries to let your colleagues to use your hunting queries.

sharing_queries

The language reference is available here
https://docs.loganalytics.io/docs/Language-Reference/

 

Happy Hunting!

 

/Sec-Labs R&D