Protect

Using WDATP Network Block

When working with Incident Response you from time to time find artifacts that you need to block, IP Addresses or specific URLs. Instead of doing this on the proxies or firewalls its often more efficient to do this on the endpoint level to catch roaming machines where ever they are. In some cases you also work with other TI vendors and get IPs and URLs you want to block and build automation around. This feature is currently in preview

So, with WDATP you can now block or allow IPs and Urls.

For this feature to work you need to have some prerequisites

  • Windows 10 1709 Pro, E3/E5 or Edu
  • Windows Defender Network Protection
  • Windows Defender AV
  • Cloud Delivered Protection Enabled

It’s possible to enable Network Protection in several ways

  • PowerShell
  • Group Policy
  • System Center Configuration Manager
  • Intune / MDM

For detailed steps for each method

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-network-protection

In our case we will just leverage PowerShell. To set and verify its configured

Set-MpPreference -EnableNetworkProtection Enabled

Get-MpPreference | fl

Once you have prepared the endpoint you can go to the  MDATP Portal and add your IPs/URLs

  1. Navigate to Settings > Rules > Indicators.
  2. Select the IP Address tab to view the list of IP’s.
  3. Select the URLs/Domains to view the list of URLs/domains.

In this tutorial we will Add a URL but the same procedure would apply for an IP.

1. Click on Add Indicator

2. Enter a url and select if you want the block to expire

3. Add an Action as you like and descriptive texts as you want to have with your alerts. In this case we want to block and get an alert for this.

4. Select Scope, in this case we will select all machines but if you have built a structure with Machine Groups you can select to target specific machine groups where this will apply.

5. On the Summary screen click Save.

Note: from entering an IP/URL it can take some time for it to propagate to the endpoints and when it comes to removal it may even take a bit longer.

So when this has propagated to the endpoints we can test it out and see how this looks on the endpoint.

When browsing to the URL the end user will be notified about that something is blocked with a toast notification and an event log entry will also be logged.

If you want to customize the toast notifications for Windows Defender you can do that with updated group policy templates more information on that here. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-security-center/wdsc-hide-notifications

To create a custom view in event viewer use this url reference.

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/event-views-exploit-guard

In our case an alert will also be triggered in in the MDATP console as well where we can continue our investigation. I hope this gave a little valuable insight on this feature.

MDATP Investigation behind forward proxy

There are still many companies using forward proxies and when analyzing traffic from endpoints this can be a bit challenging. This due to that the client connects to the forward proxy instead of the public endpoint like http://blog.sec-labs.com.

So instead of the public endpoint you would see that the process is connecting to the proxy.

Microsoft have engineers around this and by enabling the Network Protection feature in either Audit Mode or Block mode you can now see the public endpoint the process is actually communicating with behind the forward proxy.

Events that is coming from this type of detection is flagged with the a “NetworkProtection” tag.

If you want to use thees events generated when you do Hunting they are found under Network CommunicationEvents and if you know your proxy ip address you can get everything that has gone via the proxy with the following query.

NetworkCommunicationEvents

| where ActionType == “ConnectionSuccess” and RemoteIP != “ProxyIP” 

If you want to enable Network Protection the below link will guide you through the different ways you can enable it. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-network-protection

Happy Hunting

Problems with self-encrypting drives

Microsoft has published ADV180028

The advisory explains the recently discovered vulnerabilities for self-encrypting drives. SED’s means that the drive is encrypted using the hardware instead of software only encryption provided by BitLocker Drive Encryption™.

The vulnerability was discovered by Carlo Meijer and Bernard van Gastel from the Radboud University in the Netherlands.

Verify encryption method using Powershell

Get-BitLockerVolume | select encryptionmethod,mountpoint,VolumeType

bitlocker

In this example, the device is not vulnerable since hardware encryption is not present.

This code smippet will return if the machine is vulnerable or not (compliant $true) (vulnerable $false) based on encryption method which can be used with SCCM to get an overview in larger Environments.
$BitlockerVolume = Get-BitLockerVolume | select encryptionmethod,mountpoint,VolumeType,ProtectionStatus |? { $_.VolumeType -eq "OperatingSystem" -and $_.ProtectionStatus -eq "On" }

switch ($BitlockerVolume.encryptionmethod) {
Aes128 { $true }
Aes256 { $true }
Aes128Diffuser { $true }
Aes256Diffuser { $true }
XtsAes128 { $true }
XtsAes256 { $true }
Default { $false }
}

This work was done together with Jörgen Nilsson (https://ccmexec.com) who has a detailed post about this and how to use SCCM to get the current status of compliant devices which is linked to below. He also provided a cab-fil which can be imported

Bitlocker Compliance using SCCM including Hardware encryption check

SEC-LABS recognized at August 2018 Security Researcher’s list at MSRC

msrc
The Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) is pleased to recognize the security researchers who have helped make Microsoft online services safer by finding and reporting security vulnerabilities. Each name listed represents an individual or company who has privately disclosed one or more security vulnerabilities in our online services and worked with us to remediate the issue.

 

Both Stefan Schörling and Mattias Borg from SEC-LABS R&D is recognized at the Microsoft Security Response Center security researchers list for August 2018.

This was due to a vulnerability discovered with Johan Dahlbom and was reported to Microsoft.

We would like to give our appreciation to the MSRC team and it was a pleasure working with you to resolve this issue!

The list can be found here:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/researcher-acknowledgments-online-services

Working with Roles in Windows Defender ATP

As with everything else we want to apply a least privilege access.

If you need permission to do X you should only have access to do X and not several other things.

That’s why you should define the roles and reponsibilities in your organization to make sure you can apply a least privilege strategy.

Many products supports RBAC and should be used.

Working with Roles in Windows Defender ATP is very simple. You can enable it in Settings menu.

Settings > Roles > Enable Roles

enableRoles

The Global administrator role is added by default and have full permissions which can’t be changed.

Creating Roles

It’s not a bad idea to create a few roles, even if it’s just ju who are the complete security team. One reason is organizational changes and one important reason is that we don’t want people to work as global administrators.

Create Role

In Settings > Permissions > Roles > Add Role

createrole

Assign Azure AD group to the role

aadgroups

 

One example of roles setup could be:

  • Viewonly – For managers, able to view data
  • ATP-Users – Teams working with ATP, run scans, threat remediation etc
  • ATP-Administrators – ATP Admins, change settings and manage security roles

Depending on your organization you might need more defined roles list.

Here is the permission list and sub items is what will be granted more specific to the role.

  • View Data
    • View Data
  • Alerts investigation
    • Manage alerts
    • Initiate automated investigations
    • Run scans
    • Collect investigation packages
    • Manage machine tags
  • Active remediation actions
    • Take responsive actions
    • Approve or dismiss pending remediation actions
  • Manage security settings
    • Configure alert suppression settings
    • Manage allowed/blocked lists for automation
    • Manage folder exclusions for automated (applies globally)
    • Onboard and offboard machines
    • Manage email notifications

Working with Machine Groups

To be able to separate duties even further and configure different automatic remediation rules for different Machines we have the Machine Groups features.

Machine Groups is a way to group onaboarded Machines based on Name, Domain, Machine Tag and Operating System.

machinegroup

When using the “Show preview” at the bottom of the configuration page, you can see which onboarded machines will added to the Group.

You can select automation level

  • Semi – Require approval for any remediation
  • Semi – Require approval for non-temp folders remediation
  • Semi – Require approval for core folders remediation
  • Full – Remediate threats automatically

And you can assign a Azure AD userg group with roles to the machine group

mg_usergroup

The Groups, depending on how you defined group membership rules, will be populated automatically.

change_preview

more information about Machine Groups can be found here:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/machine-groups-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection

more information about RBAC in WD ATP can be found here:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/assign-portal-access-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection

Happy Hunting!

/Sec-Labs R&D

 

 

 

Threat Hunting with Windows Defender ATP

A while ago Microsoft released the Threat Hunting capatibilities in WD ATP.

This is a great feature since you’re able to query a lot of things across your devices.

Example scenario:

Let’s say you receive IoC’s for an ongoing attack or investigate threat actors with known files or IP’s you can Query these IoC’s on both on-prem devices and devices which only exists on the internet and never in the office.

That’s one of the benefits of using cloud security services.

As we wrote in the last post it’s now possible to onboard older operating systems like Windows 7 and Windows 8.1. There is also possible to onboard Linux systems and Macs

linux_mac_atp

Threat Hunting

hunting_atp

The hunting capatibilities in WD ATP involves running queries and you’re able to query almost everything which can happen in the Operating System.

If you’re familiar with Sysinternals Sysmon your will recognize the a lot of the data which you can query.

 

AlertEvents
AlertId, EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, Severity, Category, Title, ActionType, FileName, SHA1, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, ReportId

MachineInfo
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ClientVersion, PublicIP, OSArchitecture, OSPlatform, OSBuild, IsAzureADJoined, LoggedOnUsers, MachineGroup, ReportId,

ProcessCreationEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, SHA256, MD5, ProcessId, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessIntegrityLevel, ProcessTokenElevation, ProcessCreationTime, AccountDomain, AccountName, AccountSid, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessSHA256, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, ReportId

NetworkCommunicationEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, LocalIP, LocalPort, LocalIPType, RemoteIPType, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, ReportId

FileCreationEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, SHA256, MD5, FileOriginUrl, FileOriginReferrerUrl, FileOriginIP, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, ReportId

RegistryEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, RegistryKey, RegistryValueType, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, PreviousRegistryValueName, PreviousRegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, ReportId

LogonEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, AccountDomain, AccountName, AccountSid, LogonType, ReportId

ImageLoadEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, MD5, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InitiatingProcessTokenElevation, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, ReportId

MiscEvents
EventTime, MachineId, ComputerName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, MD5, AccountDomain, AccountName, AccountSid, RemoteUrl, RemoteComputerName, ProcessCreationTime, ProcessTokenElevation, LogonId, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP, LocalPort, FileOriginUrl, FileOriginIP, AdditionalFields, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessSHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessParentId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessLogonId, ReportId

The query language is very similar to Splunk and adoption to these queries should be straight forward

ProcessCreationEvents
| where EventTime > ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "Net.WebClient"
or ProcessCommandLine has "DownloadFile"
or ProcessCommandLine has "Invoke-WebRequest"
or ProcessCommandLine has "Invoke-Shellcode"
or ProcessCommandLine has "Invoke-Mimikatz"
or ProcessCommandLine has "http:"
| project EventTime, ComputerName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| top 100 by EventTime

Use “Project” to select which columns you want in the output and you can export the result to a spreadsheet.

output

In the above example we ran a query to find malicious powershell commands being executed.

You can also, for example, query all powershell executions from Office applications

ProcessCreationEvents
| where EventTime > ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "powershell"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpoint.exe")

You can also use the quick search to finns URL’s, File hashes, IPs

quick search

The output will show you hits in organization and prevalance world wide which will give you more indication of a threat.

When we search for a filehash we can also submit the file for deeper analysis.

Microsoft has a Github repositories to help you with example queries

https://github.com/Microsoft/WindowsDefenderATP-Hunting-Queries

Sharing Queries

When working in a team it’s a good idea to share your queries to let your colleagues to use your hunting queries.

sharing_queries

The language reference is available here
https://docs.loganalytics.io/docs/Language-Reference/

 

Happy Hunting!

 

/Sec-Labs R&D

Onboarding older Windows Versions to WD ATP

Today Microsoft announced  that it’s now possible to onboard older legacy operatingsystems to ATP (Advanced Threat Protection) when the public preview that is available.

  • Windows 7 SP1 Enterprise
  • Windows 7 SP1 Pro
  • Windows 8.1 Pro
  • Windows 8.1 Enterprise

Even though we Always recommend using the latest versions there might be scenarios where you need the advanced detection and response capatibilities and  of ATP and it’s not possible to upgrade the machines.

The difference between Windows 10 and the older versions is that is not built-in and you have to install an Microsoft Monitoring agent which will connect to your workspace and report the sensor data.

Installing the agent

64-bit agent is available here:
https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=828603

32-bit agent is available here:
https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=828604

When you have downloaded the setup file you extract it using “/c” parameter

Install command
setup.exe /qn NOAPM=1 ADD_OPINSIGHTS_WORKSPACE=1 OPINSIGHTS_WORKSPACE_AZURE_CLOUD_TYPE=0 OPINSIGHTS_WORKSPACE_ID= OPINSIGHTS_WORKSPACE_KEY= AcceptEndUserLicenseAgreement=1

The workspace ID and Key is available in your ATP Portal https://securitycenter.windows.com

 

The clients will connect to the service using HTTPS and can be a direct connection or through a proxy or OMS gateway.

Agent Resource Ports
*.oms.opinsights.azure.com 443
*.blob.core.windows.net 443
*.azure-automation.net 443
*.ods.opinsights.azure.com 443
winatp-gw-cus.microsoft.com 443
winatp-gw-eus.microsoft.com 443
winatp-gw-neu.microsoft.com 443
winatp-gw-weu.microsoft.com 443
winatp-gw-uks.microsoft.com 443
winatp-gw-ukw.microsoft.com 443

 

When your clients are configured you should start seeing them in the ATP console

As you may have noticed there’s a link to Azure ATP alerts where you can dig further on advanced attacks in your environment.

On the following link you can find more information about onboarding older Windows Versions to Defender ATP
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-atp/onboard-downlevel-windows-defender-advanced-threat-protection

Happy Hunting

 

/SEC-LABS R&D

 

 

Controlling Auto Forward Rules of Emails to avoid data leakage

Email Forwarding is a challenge when it comes to modern attacks, and it was recently used as one of the tools in a crimecase in Sweden. Basically the attackers forwarded all emails from the victims to themselves to be able to track the victims very easily and to gain insights and data for social engineering attacks. Multifactor auth via e-mail or password reset links where obtained and could easly be used to manipulate and gain access.

Email forwarding can be created in Outlook or the the web application (OWA) by the users or an attacker with access to a user account.

The solution for this is very easy.
You can block email forwarding and redirects in general and allow it where it’s necessary (if you do have that scenario).

Block autoforward domain wide for Office 365 using PowerShell:

Set-RemoteDomain Default -AutoForwardEnabled $false

It is possible to configure this on a per domain basis.
For instance, if you need to allow forward to specific domain.

To view all forwarding rules today both on-prem and cloud you can use the following script.
The only difference is the connection part.

View the Rules

Function Get-AutoForwardRules
{
foreach ($a in (Get-Mailbox -ResultSize Unlimited |select PrimarySMTPAddress))
{
Get-InboxRule -Mailbox $a.PrimarySMTPAddress |
?{($_.ForwardTo -ne $null) -or ($_.ForwardAsAttachmentTo -ne $null) -or ($_.DeleteMessage -eq $true) -or ($_.RedirectTo -ne $null)} |
select Name,Identity,ForwardTo,ForwardAsAttachmentTo, RedirectTo, DeleteMessage
}
}

#Example

Get-AutoForwardRules

To get the PowerShell module for office 365 which supports MFA.

Download the PowerShell Module (available in the 365 admin portal)

Connect using: Connect-EXOPSSession -UserPrincipalName user@example.com

Security Features in Office 365

Depending on your Office 365 Subscription you might get a warning email when someone tries to define a forwarding rule

 

This is an example for Exchange Online

$Mailboxes = Get-Mailbox -ResultSize "Unlimited"
$Count = 1
ForEach ($Mailbox in $Mailboxes)
{
Write-Progress -Activity "Checking inboxrules..." -Status "User $($Mailbox.PrimarySmtpAddress) ($count/$($Mailboxes.count))" -PercentComplete ($Count / $Mailboxes.count*100)
$MailboxWithRule = Get-InboxRule -Mailbox $Mailbox.Alias | Where-Object {($_.RedirectTo -ne $null) -and ($_.ForwardTo -ne $null) -and ($_.ForwardAsAttachmentTo -ne $null)}
if ($MailboxWithRule -ne $Null) {
Write-Host "Mailbox $($Mailbox.PrimarySmtpAddress) has these rulez:" $MailboxWithRule |
fl Name, Identity, RedirectTo, ForwardTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo
}
$count++
}

Updates to Attack Surface Reduction Rules in Windows 10 1803

5 new rules are being introduced with Windows 10 1803

  • Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criteria
  • Use advanced protection against ransomware
  • Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)
  • Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
  • Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB

 

Complete Rules list with GUIDs

Rule name GUID
Block executable content from email client and webmail BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550
Block Office applications from creating child processes D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A
Block Office applications from creating executable content 3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899
Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes 75668C1F-73B5-4CF0-BB93-3ECF5CB7CC84
Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D
Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts 5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC
Block Win32 API calls from Office macro 92E97FA1-2EDF-4476-BDD6-9DD0B4DDDC7B
Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criteria 01443614-cd74-433a-b99e-2ecdc07bfc25
Use advanced protection against ransomware c1db55ab-c21a-4637-bb3f-a12568109d35
Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) 9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2
Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c
Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB b2b3f03d-6a65-4f7b-a9c7-1c7ef74a9ba4

 

Details about the rules can be found here:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard

 

TechDays Sweden – Take care of your clients, you don’t WannaCry

In October SEC-LABS R&D Crew will be presenting at the Swedish Premier Microsoft IT Event TechDays. We will be talking about how to Secure your Windows clients, we are going to walk you through the Microsoft security stack you can use to protect your Windows client with. We will be focusing not only on Windows 10 but other solutions and practices you can leverage to build a more secure client environment.

http://tdswe.se/events/take-care-of-your-clients-you-dont-wannacry/ 

We hope to see you there / Stefan and Mattias

We have embedded a video from last years event below (Swedish)